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Idaho State Bar No. 3898
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HARRIS, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Appellant

Supreme Court Docket No. 36601-2009
lefferson County Docket No. 2005-642

v.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
FOXHOLLOW CONSTRUCTION &
TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho
corporation, L.N. JOHNSON PAVING,
LLC. a limited liability company,
Respondents,
and
DA VID EGAN, an individuaL
FERGUSON FARMS, d/b/a
FERGUSON TRUCKING, D. KYM
FERGUSON, an individual. MICHAEL
FERGUSON. an individuaL
Respondents.

Harris, Inc. C'Harris"), by and through its counsel of record, Norman G. Reece, P.c., hereby
submits the following Appellant's Reply Brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case \vas set forth fully in Appellant's initial brief and will not be
repeated here. See genera/~r Appellant's Briel: dated September L 2010 ("Appellant's Brief) at 2-8.
Therefore. the nature of the case. course of proceedings. and statement of facts in Appellant's Brief
arc incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

ISSljES PRESENTEI> ON APPEAL

1.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Harris failed to prove damages?
Did the court err in refusing to award damages on the ground that the evidence did

not show whether the damages incurred were a result of the 10hnson contract, the Foxhollow
contract, or both?
3.

Did the court err in finding that the payments Harris sent to 10hnson were not for

Johnson's work on the Fremont Project?
4.

Did the court err in holding Harris f~iiled to prove the General Conditions were a part

of the subcontract with Johnson and Foxhollow and in denying indemnification to Harris?
5.

Did the comi crr in not awarding damages against the Fergusons?

6.

Did the comi crror in refusing to admit Plaintiffs Exhibit 55/55-A?

7.

Did the court err in denying Harris' Motion to Amend Findings and Conclusions?

8.

Did the court err in awarding attorney fees and court costs to Johnson against Harris?

9.

Did the court err in a\varding attorney fees and court costs to the Fergusons against

10.

Did the court err in denying Harris' Motion for New Trial?

Harris?

STANI>ARI) OF' REVIEW
Following a court trial, the appellate court reviews the record to determine if the findings of

--

---------

Al'l'lCLI.ANrS RIOI'I.Y 15RIIF - 2
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f~tct

are supported by the evidence and if the conclusions of Jaw are supportcd by the findings offact.

(irijfilh v. ('lear Lakes Trout Co .. 143 Idaho 733. 737. 1

P.3d 604. 608 (2007). appeal afier

remand, 146 Idaho 613. 200 P.3d 1] 62 (2009). In reviewing the conclusions oflaw following a
court triaL the appellate court "is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw
its o\vn conclusions from the facts presented:' Griffith, 143 Idaho at 737, 152 P.3d at 608.
As to the awards of attorney fees in this case, they are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Ahha/ka v. S'hepherd. 145 Idaho 547, 549. 18 I P.3d 473.475 (2008).
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT HARRIS,
INC. FAILED TO PROVE DAMAGES.
Harris· Appellanfs Brief discussed several items of evidence admitted at the trial as proof
of damages. The documentary evidence was admitted as business records and as such, constituted
competent substantial evidence of damages. Moreover, Scott Harris, the president of Harris, Inc.,
testi fled from personal knowledge concerning other items of damage.

Exhibit 23 - Continuation Sheet of 08/31102.
Exhibit 23 was discussed at length in Appellanfs Brief at 10-12. In its response, L.N.
10hnson merely discusses Harris' trial testimony concerning Exhibit 23, including the precise dollar
amounts reflected in Exhibit 23, and notes that Exhibit 23 was admitted over objection from the
Respondents. See Respondent, L.N. 10hnson Paving, L.L.c.'s Reply Brief on Appeal, dated
September 22. 2010 C-10hnson Brief') at 5. 10hnson then cites the trial court's First Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the court denied an award of damages on the
ground that Harris did not present evidence that Harris paid a third party to complete the work left
unfinished on the Johnson subcontract. 10hnson Brief at 19 . Yet Johnson acknowledges receiving
two progress payments from Harris for the Fremont Project while disclaiming any liability on the

AI'I'I:I.I ANI'S RII'I.'!' 13RIIF .:1
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ground that Johnson did not retain the monies received. Johnson Brief at 19-20.
The Fergusons adopt by reference Johnson's response on the damages proof: and offer no
additional argument. See Respondent's Brieffiled on behalfofFerguson. dated September 30,2010
(,'Ferguson Brief') at 16.
As noted in Harris' initial brief. certain progress payments received into evidence as Exhibit
21 are reflected in Exhibit 23. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. The trial court found, and Johnson
admitted, the progress payments were deposited into Johnson's bank account. R. 1222 "r A(l )(i)],
R. 1224

r'l A(I )(11) I: Tr. 296:7-21: 298:4-10.

Moreovcr. the damages reflected in Exhibit

are chargeable in their entirety to Johnson.

First, Scott Harris testified that the progress payments reflected in Exhibit 23 were made to both
Johnson and Foxhollow. Tr. 90:] 7-91 :2. Second. the trial court found that Egan, as Johnson's
agent. or Egan's subordinate. failed to inform Harris about unpaid invoices and misrepresented to
Harris that all third-party lessors had been paid. R. 1247 [" 2(b)], R. 1253 1'II2(d)]. Third, the court
found I Iarris incurred damages due to Egan and Johnson's breach of contract by withholding
invoices as the progress payments were made
withheld. R. 1

[~A(J)(i)]

to

Johnson during the same time the invoices were

and R. 1224-25 ['II,-r A(l)(p)-(q)]. Fourth, it is irrelevant whether

Johnson or Johnson' s agent ultimately received the proceeds from the progress payments. Harris
made the progress payments, and thus incurred damages, as a result of a breach of the contract by
Johnson through its agent. Egan.

Failure to pay and/or inform Harris about unpaid mvolces

constituted the breach of contract. Therefore. Johnson is liable for Harris' damages.

Exhibit 25 - 09/18/02 Letter from Harris to Egan.
Exhi bit 25 was admitted at trial wit/lOut objection/rom the Respondents and shows a precise
amount of damages incurred ($81,2 I 0.33), in addition to the progress payments (Exhibit 2 I), due

APPJ:LLANrs REPLY J3RIIF 4

to Johnson '5 breach of contract when Harris had to pay third-party lessors and materialmen.
Appellant's Brief at I

13.

In response, Johnson merely discusses several items of correspondence between the paJiies
in September of 2002. including Exhibit

Johnson Brief at 6-7. IIowever, Johnson offers no

argument whatsoever in response to Ilarris' contention that Exhibit

is substantive evidence of

damages.
Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson' s response on damages proof and offers no additional
argument about Exhibit 25. Ferguson Brief at 16.
The Respondents' rai lure to o ITer any argument whatsoever as to Han'is' posi tion that Exhibit
is substantive evidence of damages is critical. It is a critical omission in light of the fact that a
Harris business record.

15-LN Johnson Alternate 1" was part of Exhibit 25 and showed the precise

amounts of damages Harris incurred by way ofpayments to third-party lessors or materialmen which
Harris was obligated to pay after Johnson misrepresented to Harris that such billings had already
been paid. ,)'ee Appellant's Brief at 12-13.

Exhibit 52 - Job Cost Ledger.
Exhibit 52 was discussed in Appellant's Brief at 13-14. In response. however. Johnson
merely discusses Harris' testimony in offering Exhibit 52 (admitted over objection). but gives no
responsive argument coneerning Exhibit 52 as substantive evidence of damages. Johnson Brief at
6. Again. Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response to Exhibit 52 as damages proof. and
offers no additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 16.
The document in

E~xhibit

52 is substantive. competent evidence of damages admitted into

evidence as a business record. Respondents' failure to offer any argument whatsoever concerning
its value as substantive. competent evidence belies their contention that Harris failed to prove

damages.

Exhibit 53 - .Job Cost Journal.
Exhibit 53 is discussed in Appellant's Brief at I

In response. ho\vever. Johnson ofTers no

argument at all concerning Exhibit 53. as evidence ofdamages or otherwise. Ferguson again adopts
by reference .1ohnson·s response on damages proof. and ofTers no additional argument regarding
Exhibit 53. Ferguson Brief at 16.
As \yith Exhibit

also admitted as a business record. Respondents' failure to otTer any

argument concerning its value as substantive. competent evidence of damages bel ies their contention
that 1Iarris failed to prove damages.

Payment to Ferguson as Damages.
Harris' payment to Ferguson of certain monies that are chargeable as damages against
Johnson was discussed in Appellant's Brief at 14-15. Surprisingly, even though Harris contends
those monies are chargeable to Johnson. Johnson offers no responsive argument concerning them.
Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response on damages proof and offers no additional
argument on this particular issue. Ferguson Briefat J 6. Accordingly, Harris stands by the argument
set forth in its initial brief that Scott Harris' testimony concerning this item of damages. being
uncontradicted. cannot be arbitrarily discarded and must be accepted by the trier of fact unless
inherently improbable. S'ee Appellant's Brief at J 4-15 and authorities cited therein.

Damages from Pro Rentals Litigation.
Damages incurred by f-Iarris as a result of a separate lawsuit arising fl'om this matter were
discussed in Appellant's Briefat 15-16. As noted therein. the tria! court tookjudieial notice of Judge
Richard T. St. Clair' s Memorandum Decision and Order. filed October 16.2003, in Jefferson County
Case No. CY -03-314 ("St. Clair Decision"). Tr. 176:25-178:3. Attached in the Appendix is a

AI'I'II.LANrs RIYLY IlRIIT (,
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complete copy of Judge Sc Clair's decision.
Johnson's response to this item of damages acknowledges Harris asked the court to take
judicial notice of Judge St. Clair's decision, but fails to offer any argument whatsoever regarding the
decision as evidence of damages. Johnson Briefat 9-\ O. Instead, Johnson merely cites Scott Harris'
testimony that he did not personally know whether Johnson's equipment or employees were ev,:::r at
the job site. and that Foxhollow rented the equipment which was on the job site. Johnson Brief at
9-10.
Again, Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response on damages proof: and offers no
additional argument on this particular issue. Ferguson Brief at 16.
It is clear that Judge St. Clair's decision established damages in precise amounts which were

the result of unpaid invoices on the Fremont Project during the same time that Harris made progress
payments. S'ee Appellanfs Brief at 15: St. Clair Decision at 4.7,14-15 and 21. Judge St. Clair's
decision was not rebutted in any way by any of the Respondents. As stated, the court took judicial
notice of the decision wit/lOut objection from any of the Respondents. Tr. 176:25-178:3. Moreover,
Scott Harris' testimony concerning the specific amounts of damages he incurred - and paid - as a
result of the Pro Rentals litigation. in addition to the judgment

itselt~

went unrebutted by the

Respondents. S'ee Appellant's Briefat 15. Therefore, it could not be arbitrarily disregarded by the
trial court. See Appellant" s Brief at 16.

Harris' Testimony re Cost to Finish, Warranty
and Supervisory Work, Use of Harris Equipment.
The evidence offered by Harris in this regard was discussed in Appellant's Brief at 16-18.
Johnson's response argues that Harris' testimony in this regard was too speculative, because Harris
used such terms as "around" and '"approximately" in testifying about the costs

to

complete the

Johnson subcontract. Johnson Brief at 17-18. Johnson also takes issue for Scott Harris' "estimate"

API'ELLANrs RFI'IY 13RIIT 7
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of $7.000.00 in supervisory time even though it was based, according to tlarris. on a typical
management fee. Johnson Briefat 18. Johnson also takes issue with Scott Harris' $6,000.00 figure
for backhoe and dump truck rental. calculated at $2.000.00 per month for three months. Johnson
Brief at 18.
Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response in this regard and offers no additional
argument. Ferguson Brief at 16.
As shmvn in the next section. however. Harris' evidence of damages was not speculative.
It was substantive, competent proof of damages.

Evidence of Damages Offered by Harris was not Speculative.
As discussed in Appellant's initial brief. evidence offered by Harris as evidence of damages
was not speculative. See Appellant's Brief at ] 7. This substantive evidence was left unrebutted by
Defendants and cannot be disregarded by the court. even if it stems from the testimony of an
interested witness. See Appellant's Brief at 18 and authorities cited therein
Johnson claims 11arris' testimony on damages gave amounts that were confusing and
contradictory with no direct evidence as to damages incurred due to Johnson's alleged breach of
contract. Johnson Briefat 18-19. Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's responsive argument in
this regard. Ferguson Brief at 16.
However. "Ir]easonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical
exactitude; rather. the evidenee need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the
realm of speculation:' Todd v. Sullivan ('onslruction LLe. 146 Idaho 118, 122, 191 P .3d 196. 200
(2008) [citing Gri/lilh, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611].
As shown above. Harris submitted amounts of damages precise enough to be removed from
the realm of speculation. In most instances. precise amounts were offered into evidence - amounts

APPELLANT'S RJ:I'LY IlRIIF 8
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that were not, contrary to Respondents' assertions
instances, Scott Ilarris

~

"confusing" or "contradictory." In a few

estimates and explained the basis for his calculations. This testimony

was sufficient to avvard damages. IJeco ('O}1slruct;oJ1

('0.

v. lIarper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4,

9.936 P.2d 202.207 (el. App.). rev denied. (1997) (holding that testimony from company president
as to "approximate" amounts of damages was substantial, competent evidence supporting the jury
award).
While speculation or conjecture cannot be a basis for damages, the evidence should
approximate an accurate estimate. Felder v. Physiotherapy Associates, 215 Ariz. 154, 162, 158 P.3d
877, 885 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, it is the wrongdoer, and not the irtiured party that
'''should bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages .. ,' so '''the standard for
determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as thc standard for proving the fact of
damages. ,., Promax Development Corp. v. Matlson. 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App.), ccrt. denied,
953 P.2d 449 (1997) [quoting AIkin Wrighl & Miles v. AJoumain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
709 P.2d 330. 334 (Utah 1985)J. Therei()re. to "prove the amount of damages, the evidence must
'riser] above speculation and provide! ] a reasonable. even though not necessarily preeise, estimate
of damages. '" Promax Development ('orp., 943 P.2d at 255 [quoting AIkin FVrighl & Miles, 709 P.2d
at 334]. In the Promax case, the court held that testimony concerning the fair market value of a
home as being "approximately" $390.000.00 was sufficient to support a damages award. PromtlX
Development COfT.. 943 P.2d at 257.
Thus. the court erred in refusing to award damages to Harris. "The fact that contract damages
are not capable of exact proof does not preclude their availability as a matter of law." () 'Dell v.
Ba'\abe, 119 Idaho 796, 8 J 2, 8 J 0 P.2d 1082. 1098 (J 991). See also, Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho
274,280,923 P.2d 981.987 (1996), subsequent costs andjeesproceeding, 132 Idaho 830, 979 P.2d

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 9

1188 (1999).
If the plaintiff shows damages resulted, a court cannot refuse to award damages merely
because it is di1Ticult to determine an exact amount of damages. Griffith. 143 Idaho at 741. 152 P.3d
at 61

That is what happened here. The court found Harris incurred damages, but refused to

determine the amount of damages. "Ultimately it is fc)r the trier of fact to fix the amount by
determining the credibility of the witnesses. resolving conflicts in the evidence, and drawing
reasonable inferences therefrom." Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611. The court's refusal
10

do so requires reversal.

Harris Business Records Were Substantive Evidence of Damages.
The Harris business records as substantive. competent evidence of damages were discussed
in Appellanf s Brief at 17-18. Johnson discusses the substance of Exhibits 23 and 52, and Scott
Harris' testimony as to what those exhibits show. Johnson Brief at 5-6. 26. However. nowhere in
its response does Johnson address the admissibility of Harris' business records as substantive,
competent evidence. This is a critical omission. S'ee Beco Construction Co., 130 Idaho at 9, 936
P.2d at 207 (holding testimony from company president as to approximate amounts of damages was
substantial, competent evidence to support jury award). As noted, Ferguson offers no additional
argument in this regard. and merely adopts by reference Johnson's response. Ferguson Brief at 16.

POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD DAMAGES ON
THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHOW WHETHER
THE DAMAGES INCURRED WERE A RESULT OF THE JOHNSON
CONTRACT, THE FOXHOLLOW CONTRACT, OR BOTH.
Harris' argument in this regard entailed f()ur basic points. They are discussed in Appellant's
Brief at J 8-20.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIIF
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First and most importantly, the court found that "Foxhollow completed work on the Fremont
Project 011 behalfofJohnson 's subcontract with (Jarris, Inc." R. 1246 [~G( 1)( e)] (emphasis added).
Moreover, the court f()Und that "'all of Egan's actions were taken as the agent for Johnson alld an
employee of Foxhollow:' R. I 253
Second, Exhibit

I~I

2( d)] (emphasis added). Appellant's Brief at 18.

indeed showed a breakdmm of work completed by Foxhollow alld
:4; 76:6-15. Appellant's Brief at 19 .

.Johnson as of August 31. 2002. Tr. 74: II

Third, the court also found that Harris incurred damages due to Egan and Johnson's breach
of con tract by withholding invoices as the progress payments were made to Johnson during the same
time the invoices were withheld. R. I

[~A(1

)(i)J and R. I 224-25 [~~ A( 1)(p)-(q)]. Appellant's

Sec also S1. Clair Decision at 8.

Bridat

Fourth. the fact the court thought it was unable to segregate damages as between the Johnson
and Foxhollow subcontracts is of no moment because all damages were the result of Egan's breach
and. as the court found, Egan was Johnson's agent and Foxhollow's employee. Appellant's Brief
at 18- J 9.
In response, Johnson offers no argument or discussion concerning Egan as an employee of
Foxhollow and an agent for Johnson. Similarly, Johnson otfers no discussion or rebuttal argument
concerning the court's findings that FoxholIow completed work on the Fremont Project on behalf
of Johnson's subcontract with Harris. Again. Ferguson' s response merely adopts by reference
Johnson's response and offers no additional argument on this point. Ferguson Brief at 16.
Accordingly. Harris stands by its original argument found in its initial brief. See Appellant's
Brief at 18-20.
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POINT THREE

THE COllRT ERRED IN FINDIN(; THAT THE
PAYMENTS HARRIS SENT TO .JOHNSON WERE NOT
FOR JOHNSON'S WORK ON THE FREMONT PROJECT.
This point is initially discusscd in Appellanfs Brief at 20. Harris' argument in this regard
is four-fold:
First. the court held that "It Jhe checks Harris, Inc. paid to Johnson appear to be for the work
that Foxhollow completed on the Fremont Project."· R. 1230

[~:

13(1 )(b)]. But this is at odds with

at least two other findings the court made: (a) that "Harris, Inc. subcontracted the excavation, tilling,
grading and culvert work on the Fremont Project to both Foxhollow and Johnson" R. ] 227

[~2(b)]

(emphasis added): and (b) that ·'Harris. Inc. sent checks to Johnson for itS' portion of the excavation,
filling. grading and culvert work .. · R. 1227

[~2(b)].

Appellant's Briefat 20.

Second. Exhihit 23 showed monies paid by Harris were for both Foxhollow and Johnson as
to the Fremont Project. Tr. 74:11-75:4: 76:6-15. Appellanfs Brief at 20.
Third, given the court's finding that "all of Egan's actions were taken as the agent for
Johnson and an employee of Foxhollow."' R. 1253

[~

2(d)] (emphasis added), Foxhollow's work

on the Fremont Project was on behalf of Johnson. The court so found. R. 1246

[~

G(1)( a)].

Appellanfs Brief' at 20.
Fourth, even if the progress payments cannot be segregated between Johnson's subcontract
and Foxhollow's subcontract, the fact would remain that every payment went to either the principal
(Johnson) or its agent (Foxhollow/Egan). If all of Egan's actions were, as the court found, as an
employee of Foxhollow and an agent for Johnson, then the progress payments had to be for
Johnson's work on the Fremont Project. Appellant's Brief at 20.
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In response, Johnson merely cites the fact that payments were sent from Harris to Johnson,
after which Johnson wrote checks for the same amounts to Foxhollow. Johnson Brief at 19-20.
Johnson simply states it retained no monies for the Fremont Project.

Johnson Brief at 17.

Ferguson's response adopts Johnson's response by reference and offers no additional argument.
Ferguson Brief at 17.
As shown. the court's o\\n findings contradict its ruling that the progress payments were not
for Johnson' s work 011 the Fremont Project. As noted. the court found that all of Egan's actions were
taken as Johnson's agent and Foxhollow's employee. R. 1253

r,r 2(d)].

Moreover, the fact.lohnson

may not have retained the progress payments does not relieve it of liability. because it forwarded
those payments to its agent. The court found that Johnson' s agent committed the breach which
eaused Harris' damages. R. 1222 r,r A( 1)(i) J and R. 1224-25

r'l'i A( 1)(p)-(q)]. The fact that Johnson

may not have retained the progress payments does not relieve it ofliability. as its agent committed
the breach that caused llarris' damages.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING HARRIS FAILED TO
PROVE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS WERE A PART OF
THE SUBCONTRACT WITH JOHNSON AND FOXHOLLOW
AND IN DENYING INDEMNIFICATION TO HARRIS.
Harris' initial arguments on this issue were discussed in Appellant's Briefat 21-22. Harris'
argument is based on four main points:
First the General Conditions (Exhibit 50) was admitted without objection, after Scott Harris
testified it was a true and correct copy of the General Conditions as they existed as of 2002 and as

attached to each subcontract Harris wrote in 2002. Tr. 38: 12-39: 12. Appellant's Brief at 21.
Second. Harris' foundational testimony wel1t lmrebutted, and Exhibit 50 was admitted

without objection. Tr. 39: 13-23. Therefore, any issues as to the authenticity of Exhibit 50 were

i\PPILLANrs RJ:PIY mUll'
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waived when Respondents' counsel allowed Exhibit 50 to be admitted without objection.
Appel lant' s Brief at 21 .
Third, the trial court found that Egan, as Foxhollow's employee and Johnson's agent, had the
responsibility to assure that supplier and equipment invoices were given to Harris. R. 1250
H( I )(b)l. The only source

j()f that

r~

duty is contained in the General Conditions, Exhibit 50. No such

duty or re!lponsibili(v isfoum/ ill either of the subcontracts. Appellant's Brief at
Fourth, the court found that Johnson, through its agent Egan, breached this contractual duty
and that Harris was damaged as a result. R. 1

[~

A(l)(i)J and R. 1224-25

[~fI

A(l)(p)-(q)].

Appellant's Brief at
In response, Johnson merely argues the court's ruling on Exhibit 50 was proper, because it
was dated more than three months after the subcontract was signed, and that the subcontracts had
no (Jeneral Conditions attached to them. Johnson Brief at 20. Moreover. Johnson argues the court's
refusal to find Exhibit 50 was a part of the eontract is supported by Idaho Rule of Evidence (LR.E.)
1004(3). Johnson Brief at 21. Ferguson's response adopts by reference Johnson's response and
offers no additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 17.
Johnson's argument pertains to foundational Issues and authenticity of Exhibit 50 in
particular. However. once Exhibit 50 was admitted without o~jection from any ofthe Respondents,
it became substantive, competent evidence. Johnson's contention as to the date contained on Exhibit
50 was never brought up during the evidentiary portion of the trial. The record will show no such
attempted rebuttal. Thus, it remained substantive, competent evidence which the Court was not free
to disregard.
Any issues the Respondents had as to the authenticity of Exhibit 50 were waived when they
allowed Exhibit 50 to be admitted without objection. Tr. 39: 13-23. Several Idaho decisions so hold:
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"We will not eonsider issues pertaining to the admission of evidence when no objection was
raised to admission at triaL" Kra(y v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 303, 208 P.3d 281, 285 (2009). If a
party fails to object to an exhibit's admission at triaL it thereby waives any objection to the exhibit.

",-,. Alphonsus Diversified ('are, Inc. v. lvlRI A.,,·sociates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,494, 224 P.3d 1068,
1083 (2009). Thus. failure to object to evidence introduced at trial fails to preserve on appeal the
issue ofadmissibility. Hunter \'. State, 138 Idaho 44,51.57 P.3d

762 (2002). See also Chenery

v. Agri-Lines Corp .. 115 Idaho 28 L 286, 766 P.2d 751, 756 (1988) (holding that if a party fai!s to
object to the admission of evidence at trial, the issue of its admission is not properly before the
appellate court); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 596, 603 P.2d 156, 162 (1979) (holding
that ira party fails to object to an exhibit's admission into evidence. the party cannot on appeal raise
the issue of error in the exhibit's admission).
In short, any issue as to authenticity was waived by the Respondents when they failed to
object at trial. Continental Western Insurance Co. v. KF5,', Inc., 30 Kan. App. 2d 1262, 1266, 59
P.3d 1.4 (2002). rev. denied. 275 Kan. 963 (2003). Furthermore, the court erred in refusing to find
that Exhibit 50 contained the General Conditions that were a part of the subcontracts, yet holding
Johnson and Egan responsible based on the duty that was only found in Exhibit 50.
Johnson's argument that I.R.E. 1004(3) precludes admission of Exhibit 50 is disingenuous.
First of all, no objection on that ground was made at the trial, so any such objection is waived.
Moreover, l.R.E. 1004(3) does not apply in this instance. There was never any showing that the
original was in control of the party against whom offered, i. e., Johnson, FoxhoIlow, and/or the
Fergusons. Therefore, I.R.E. 1004(3) simply does not apply. Furthermore, under LR.E. 1003, a
duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless there is a genuine issue concerning
authenticity or "continuing effectiveness of the original. or admission of the duplicate instead of the
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original \vould be unfltir." Again, Respondents made no such showing in this case and, as noted,
simply did not object on authcnticity or any other grounds to the admission of Exhibit 50.
POINT FIVE
THE COlJRT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
DAMAGES AGAINST THE FERGUSONS.
Harris' arguments on this issue \\'erc initially discussed in Appellant's Briefat 22-25. They
consisted of five main points:
First the trial court found Harris' unjust enrichment claim against Ferguson was based on
Foxhollow's failure to submit invoices from Pro Rentals and Western States in a timely manner. R.
1237-38 ['J 2(b)]. Appellant's Brief at
Second, the trial court also found Harris never received the Pro Rentals or Western States
invoices from Foxhollow, Egan or Johnson. R. 1224-25

[~:~r

A( 1)(p)-(q)]. Appellant's Brief at 23.

Third, Judge St. Clair's decision shows the lessors remained unpaid, and that judgment
against Harris was entered for those amounts. St Clair Decision at 4,7,14-15 and 21. Moreover,
Ferguson admitted Egan's signature appeared on a Ferguson invoice and that Foxhollow billings
went through Egan for review before submission to Harris. Tr. 599:8-24. Appellant's Brief at 23.
Fourth, the court rejected evidence offered by Harris that Ferguson told Harris' job
superintendent that Ferguson was withholding supplier and lessor invoices from Harris. R. 1255 ['J
I( 1)(0], The com1 ruled that assuming the conversation occurred, it was not evidence of fraud but
merely put Harris on notice that all invoices had not been submitted. R. 1258

[~2(d)].

However,

the "putting Harris on notice" rationale fails, because the progress payments had already been made
and the damages already resulted. In other words, Ferguson was putting Harris on notice the contract
had already been breached, and the "notice" came after damages had accrued. At a minimum, this
shows Ferguson's acquiescence in fraud or other wrongdoing of the corporation. Appellant's Brief

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRill
98-207.176

~

16

at
Fifth. Harris cited case law discussing personal liability of corporate officers who participate
or acquiesce in fraud or othcr wrongdoing of the corporation. Appellant's Brief at 24. Harris also
cited case law showing the court erred in ruling Harris had to first pierce the corporate veil in order
to hold Ferguson personally liable. Appellant's Brief at 24.
Finally. Harris cited statutory law showing the Ferguson partnership and Michael Ferguson
were liable for Kym Ferguson's fraudulent conduct as well. Appellant's Briefa124-25.
In response. Ferguson claimed that even if the conversation between Harris' job
superintendent and Ferguson took place, thejob superintendent testified he already knew Foxhollow
had not turned in all of the billings. Ferguson Brief at 20-21. Ferguson adds that Kym Ferguson
testified he did not know billings and invoices were to be turned into Harris and was unaware of any
unpaid billings except one from Pro Rental as of the time he resigned from Foxhollow. Ferguson
Briefat 21. Ferguson argues that ifFoxhollow intentionally withheld billings and invoices, Ferguson
vvould not have paid the Pro Rental billing. nor would Egan have turned in the invoices or payroll;
rather, all billings and invoices would have been stopped. Ferguson Brief at 21
However, it is of no consequence that Harris' job superintendent already knew that
Foxhollow had 110t turned in all billings as of the time the conversation between the superintendent
and Ferguson occurred. That is what precipitated the conversation in the first place. If the job
superintendent had not known billings had been withheld. he would have had no reason to confront
Ferguson about the problem. In addition. the fact that some billings were paid does not preclude the
fact that Foxho Ilow wi thheld other bi II ings. Moreover. Ferguson's argument that Harris cannot show
detrimental reliance because it continued to pay payroll and equipment suppliers after it became
aware that invoices had been withheld fails as \vell, because the damage had already been done.
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Finally, Kym Ferguson's denial of knowledge that billings were to be submitted to Harris is
belied hy his own trial testimony concerning a Ferguson invoice:
Q.

Would you turn to your Exhihit Trip N.

A.

N as in Nancy?

Q.

Correct.

A.

(Witness complies.) Okay.

Q.

Do you see your signature at the hottom of Exhihit
first page in Exhibit Triple N'?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you identify whose signature that is in the middle of the
description column'?

A.

On the first page?

Q.

Yes. sir.

A.

It looks like Dave Egan, but I'm not sure.

Q.

Okay. Are you familiar with Dave Egan's signature?

A.

Somewhat.

Q.

Because he was your business associatefor a while, correct?

A.

Right.

Q.

If indeed that is David Egan's signature on this exhibit, can
you explain why his signature would be on a Ferguson
Trucking invoice?

A.

Because it was handed to him to be submitted to Scott
Harris.

Q.

Okay. So this is, I guess, a notation system that you
gentlemen decided upon to ensure or to show that you had
handed it over to Dave Egan and in turn for him to hand it to
Scott Harris: is that --

APPILLAN'I'S RFPLY BRIIF
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of the

A.

I don't think so. I think thars Scott lIan'is' tracking deal, not

Q.

Well. but Scott Harris wouldn't have put Dave Egan's
signature on there. I'm, I'm trying to - you indicated that,
that you think that this is Dave Egan' s signature just to show
that he's acknowledging receipt from you; is that correct?

A.

He's acknowledging that he approved the billing to be

handed to Scott Harris.
Q.

Oh, okay. So this is an. an approval mark that Dave Egan
would have put on there, which would indicate, okay, this is
okay to submit to Harris Incorporated; is that what it is?

A.

That's the way I understand it was supposed to work.

Q.

Okay. All right.

T r. 599: 1-600:20 (emphasis added).

POINT SIX
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 55/55-A.
The court refused to admit Exhibit 55/55-A due to concerns of accuracy and late disclosure.
Tr. 102:22-103 :8: 109:22-1 10:6.
However, as to the accuracy concern, Scott Harris had already provided all foundational
testimony necessary to admit the exhibit as a business record. Tr. 93: 10-95:5; 95:20-96:8.
As to the non-disclosure ground, the court abused its discretion in not admitting the exhibit
for several reasons. First. most ifnot all of the documents that were the subject of the non-disclosure
issue were provided to Respondents' counsel over one year before formal discovery requests were
served by Respondents.

Tr. 148: 13-149: 11.

Second, all tile materials were produced for

Respondents' counsel in conjunction with Scott Harris' deposition duces tecum. Tr. 139: 17-140:2;
148: 13-149: 11; 151: 14-20. Third, the exhibit which the trial court refused to admit was merely an

--- --
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update from a prior exhibit submitted into

exhibit binders in accordance with the pre-trial order.

Tr. 97:23-99: I O. Therefore. at a minimum, the court should have at least admitted so much of the
exhibit as was in the trial exhibit binder. Finally, the court's ruling in this regard was inconsistent
in that the court admitted another trial exhibit in spite of Respondents objections over late or no
disclosure. Tr. I

18. The court's inconsistent rulings were error when it refused to admit one

document on the same grounds to which admission of another document was allowed.
In response. Johnson merely argues that the trial court correctly refused to admit the exhibit
because the discovery rules require seasonable supplementation and because 11arris fai led to comply
with the scheduling order. Johnson Brief at

. Ferguson's response adopts by reference

Johnson's response and otTers no additional input. Ferguson Brief at 17.
However, Johnson's argument that implies Harris did not seasonally supplement discovery
responses fails in light of Harris' providing most. ifnot all, of the relevant documents over one year
before the Respondents served formal discovery requests, and in light of Harris' deposition duces

tecum at which time all file materials were provided. Johnson fails to discuss these matters at all in
its brief.
Furthermore. the court excused compliance with the scheduling order in admitting Exhibit
53. and should have done likewise and admitted Exhibit 55-A. Again. Respondents do not address
this issue at all.

POINT SEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING HARRIS, INC.'S
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.
Harris' contentions in this regard are initially discussed in Appellant's Briefat 26-27. Harris
contends the court erred in failing to

f~nd

Foxhollow as an agent of Johnson.

The trial court found that all of Egan's actions were taken as Johnson's agent and
Foxhollow's employee. R. 1253

[~2(d)].
-~----
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The court also found that Foxhollow completed work on
---------~---

--------------~--

----~----~--~-

the Fremont Project on behalf of Johnson. R. J 246

['i G( 1)( e) 1.

Finally, the court found "Johnson

was bound to provide excavation, filling. grading, culvert and asphalt concrete paving on the
Fremont Projeet." R. 1240 [,1 E(I)(a)J. Exhibit 2}, as noted, shows Foxhollow did that work and
that Johnson was credited for at least some of the work.
Therefore, the court should have amended its findings and conclusions to add that Foxhollow
was also Johnson's agent on the Fremont Project. Such a finding was critical in light of the court's
difTieulties in determining whether unpaid invoices pertained to Johnson's subcontract, Foxhollow's
subcontract. or both. ,<';ee generally Appellant's Brief at 18-20, 26.
I Iowever, in ruling on the motion to amend findings and conclusions, the court did not even
discuss the agency vel non of Foxhollow.
In response. Johnson argues the court determined Harris may have proved breach of contract
by Johnson, but failed

to

prove any damages. Johnson Brief at 23. There is no discussion from

Johnson as to whether the court erred in failing to find Foxhollow was an agent of Johnson as well.
The Ferguson Respondents merely adopt by reterence Johnson's response on this issue and offer no
additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 17.
The court's crror in ruling that Harris failed to prove any damages was discussed earlier. See

supra at 3-13. Moreover, a trial court is reversed on appeal for failure to find on every material issue
unless such finding would not af1ect the judgment entered. Doe v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 907, 71 P.3d
1040. 1054 (2003). The Respondents did not discuss at all whether the court erred in failing to find
Foxhollow was an agent ofJolmson. This was clearly a material issue, given the court's apparent
difficulty in apportioning damages between the Johnson contract and the Foxhollow contract, even
though the evidence clearly showed Foxhollow was an agent of Johnson as well.
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POINT EIGHT
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES ANI)
COURT COSTS TO JOHNSON A(;AINST HARRIS.
Harris' initial argument on this issue is f(mnd in Appellant's Brief at

I. It consists of

five main points:
First the gravamen of Harris' claims against Johnson was fraud. not a commercial
transaction. Appellant's Brief at 28-29.
Second, the court erred in awarding costs and fees after finding Johnson was not the overall
prevailing party and that Johnson was unsuccessful in his defense. A non-prevailing party has no
right to recovery of attorney fees or court costs. Hackelf v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261,265, 706 P.2d
13

1376 (Ct. App. 1985). Appellant's Brief at 29.
Third. Johnson's memorandum of costs fails to itemize the fees and costs claimed.

Appellant's Brief at 29.
Fourth, Johnson' s aHidavit in support offees failed to address the factors found in Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure (LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Appellant's Brief at 29-30.
Fifth. the court erroneously based its decision on its belief that Harris failed to sufficiently
delineate between damages caused by the Johnson subcontract and damages caused by the
Foxhollow subcontract. Appellant's Brief at 30-31.
In response, Johnson asserts the court found Harris' claims were from a commercial
transaction and under a contract pursuant to Idaho Code (I.c.) § 12-120(3), and that the court's
decision should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Johnson Briefat 24-25. Johnson adds
that in determining who was the prevailing party, the court should not focus on tallying issues or
counts in a complaint but should evaluate the results in relation to the relief sought by each party.
Johnson Briefat 24. Johnson further adds that it prevailed against Harris on all counts as to damages
as is therefore the prevailing party. Johnson Brief at 23.
APPEI.I.!\l\!rS REPLY BRIEF
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However, the fact remains that the court found Johnson was not the overall prevailing party;
therefore, Johnson is not entitled to attorney fees and court costs at all. Hackett, 109 Idaho at 265,
706 P.2d at 1376. Johnson ll1iled to cross-appeal the court's ruling in this regard. Moreover,
Johnson provides no responsive argument whatsoever to Harris' contentions that it failed to itemize
the attorney time and

t~liled

to address the Rule 54(e)(3) tactors.

POINT NIN·E
THE COlJRT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND
COlJRT COSTS TO THE FERGlJSONS AGAINST HARRIS.
As discussed at pp. 31-35 of the Appellant' s

Briet~

Harris contends the court erred

111

awarding attorney fecs and court costs against Harris and in favor of the Fergusons. Harris cites four
basic points in support of this contention: First. the Fergusons were not a prevailing party. Second,
the gravamen of the action was not a commercial transaction. Third, a certain release signed by Kym
Ferguson precludes recovery by the Fergusons. Finally, the Fergusons' motion for costs and fees
was detective.

Fergusons Not a Prevailing Party
The Fergusons concede that Harris prevailed on their counterclaim which, in light of the
release, the court found to be frivolous and accordingly deducted a certain amount of attorney fees
claimed by the Fergusons. Ferguson Brief at 28-29. The Fergusons contend that Kym Ferguson
successfully defended Harris' attempts to pierce the corporate veil and hold him personally liable
for fraud.

Ferguson Brief at 27-28. (That shows the gravamen of the action was tort, not a

commercial transaction, as discussed further below.) The Fergusons further argue that the court
granted summary judgment for them on all of Harris' claims, none of which were pursued at trial on
the merits, and that Harris docs not appeal from the summary judgment or to the court. Ferguson
Brief at 27.
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The Fergusons' arguments notvvithstanding. they were not a prevailing party. Fergusons'
argument that Harris did not appeal from the summary judgment or the court flies in the face of
Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 17. Under that rule. the notice ofappeaJ is deemed to include all "final
judgments. orders and decrees entered after the judgment, order or decree appealed from." LA.R.
17(e)(1)(C).
Simply put, there was no overall prevailing party as betwccn the Fergusons and Harris. After
trial. and following the court's post-trial rulings on various summary judgment motions made prior
to trial. all of Fergusons' claims against Harris had been dismissed. and all of Han is' claims against
the Fergusons had been dismissed. Consequently, there was no overall prevailing party, and neither
I lanis nor the Fergusons were entitled to attorney fees against the other. See Appellant's Brief at
31.

The court itself acknowledged that before trial. "Harris, Inc. dismissed its contract-based
claims against the Fergllsons." R. 1541. Following the trial, and after Harris had abandoned its
contract-based claims against the Fergusons. the court "dismissed" those same claims in the posttrial decision on summary judgment. R. 1164. But also following trial. the court dismissed the
Fergusons' counterclaim against Harris in its entirety finding that a certain release signed by Kym
Ferguson "nullified" the Fergusons' counterclaim and that as a result, the Fergusons' entire
counterclaim was ·'frivolous." R. 1541, 1542. See generally Appellant's Brief at 31-33.
Therefore, with no overall prevailing party, the court erred in awarding attorney fees and
court costs to the Fergusons. Mere dismissal

01'£1

claim before trial does not render the party against

whom the claim was made the prevailing party. Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 692,
682 P.2d 640. 645 (CL App. 1984). on appeal afierfee award rev 'd. 115 Idaho 281. 766 P.2d 751

(1988); P.N. Cedar, Inc. v. D & G Shake Co., 110 Idaho 561, 569, 716 P.2d 1333, 1341 (et. App.
1986).
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Gravamen Not a Commercial Transaction.
The court furthcr erred in holding the gravamen of the case "arose out of a commercial
transaction:' R. I

There Wll5' no contract between Ferguson lind HlIrris other titan the

agreement which the court found was covered by the release!

Moreover, the court itself

acknowledged that all of Harris' claims which \vould form the basis of a commercial transaction
between Harris and the Fergusons had beenllballdoned prior to tria/. R. 1536-37, 1541. See also
Appellanfs Brief at
Even the Fergusons acknowledge that prior to trial, Harris dismissed its contract-based claims
against them. Ferguson Brierat 27. They also concede that the only issue on which they prevailed
was a tort cause of action

Harris' attempts to pierce the corporate veil and hold Kym Ferguson

personally liable for fraud. Ferguson Brief at 27-28.
Even the court conceded that the attorney fees it awarded the Fergusons against Harris arose
"out of the Fergllsons' involvement with Foxhollow and the Fergusons' subcontract with Foxhollow
on the Fremont Project." R. 1544 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the commercial transaction
cited by the court as the "gravamen" of the case upon which fees were awarded against Harris to
Fergllsons was betvveen Fergusons and another party, not Hani s. Awarding attorney fees on thi s
basis was clearly error. because in order to apply I.e. § 12-120, the commercial transaction forming
the basis of the award had to be between Harris and the Fergusons. See Beco Construction Co. v.

J-U-B Engineers. Inc .. 145 Idaho 719, 726,184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008).
The trial court specifically held that the only issue remaining for trial as to the Fergusons was
Hanis' fraud claim against Kym Ferguson and its related unjust enrichment claim. R. 1158, 1162.

See also Appellant's Brief at 32-33. The court further noted that Kym Ferguson successfully
defended against Harris' attempts to pierce the corporate veil and hold him individually liable. R.
1541. Avoidance of such liability can only be in the context of tort. Therefore, the court erred in
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awarding any attorney fees for trial time spent by the Fergusons' attorney, because the entirety of the
trial time was in defending against tort claims; it had nothing whatsoever to do with commercial
transactions which the court held were between the Fergusons and Foxhollow, not Harris. Beco

Construction, 145 Idaho at 726, 184 P.3d at 851 (holding party seeking attorney fees under I.e. §
120 not entitled

to

fees incurred after contract claim dismissed). Clearly, the gravamen of the

case as it proceeded to trial was tort not contract.
The Fergusons cite Blimka v. A1y Weh Wholesaler. L.L.C, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 597
(2007) and Leftunich v. Key Bank National Associal ion, 14 I Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1 104 (2005)

appeal afier remand 145 Idaho 746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008) in support oftheir contention that they are
entitled to fees in spite ofthe fact their entire trial defense related to a tort cause of action. However,
both the Blimka and Letlunich cases are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
In Blhnka, the court held the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney fees on a fraud
claim which sought damages as a result of a commercial transaction. Blimka. 143 Idaho at 729, 152
P.3d at 600. However, in Blimka. all of the plaintifTs causes of action arose from afralldillent
commercial transaction; i.e., the commercial transaction itself was fraudulent from its inception.

Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725-26, 152 P.3d at 596-97. In Blimka, the defendants misrepresented the
amount and quality of certain goods to be shipped to the plaintiff. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725, 152
P.3d at 596. In reliance 011 those misrepresentations, the pJaintiffwired payment to the defendants.

Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725-26, 152 P.3d at 596-97. When the goods arrived, the shipment was short
some 10,000 items, and the items were not the quality represented. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725-26,
P.3d at 596-97. Since the plaintiff sought damages resulting from that fraudulent transaction,
the court awarded attorney fees under I.e. § 1 120(3). Blimka, 143 Idaho at 729, 152 P.3d at 600.
In Lettunich, the court likewise considered a fraud claim based entirely on a commercial
transaction. In that case, the plaintiff applied to the bank for three loans, and the bank responded
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with commitment letters. Lettunhk 141 Idaho at

109 P

at 1107. The plaintiff signed the

commitment letters and in reliance thereon. purchased certain cattle. Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 366,
109 P.3d at II OS. Therealter. the bank refused to proceed with the loans. so plaintiff sued the bank
fiJr fj'au(i. breach of contract. and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Lettunich,
141 Idaho at 366, 109 P.3d at 11 OS. The Leffunich court held that. since al/ of the plaintiff's claims
arose from the alleged misrepresentations by the defendants, al/ of plaintiff s claims were integral
to the commercial transaction, and thus were within the scope of I.C. § 1 120.
Thus, in both Blimka and Lettunich. the ell tire commercial transaction arose as a result of
alleged misrepresentations by the defendants. By contrast, in this case, the commercial transaction
did Ilot arise as a result of alleged misrepresentations by Ferguson. The fraud took place after the
subcontracts with L.N. Johnson and Foxhollow were signed and during the course of work called
for under the contracts. There was no signed contract with Ferguson. Indeed, at trial, counsel for
Ferguson and counsel for Harris stipulated the fraud claim was the only claim pending between
Harris and Ferguson. Blimka does not stand fiJI" the proposition that fraud not based on a commercial
transaction comes within the scope of I.e. § I

120. Here, the oral contract between Harris and

Ferguson was not a commercial transaction which involved tOliiollS conduct, as in Blimka.
As noted, the only issue on which the action proceeded to trial as against the Fergusons was
a fraud claim. There was not fraudulent commercial transaction which itself was the basis for
Harris' fraud claims against the Fergusons. There was simply no contract between Harris and the
Fergusons until after the events giving rise to Han'is' fraud claim against the Fergusons. Blimka does
not stand for the proposition that fraud not based on a commercial transaction comes within the
scope of I.C. § 12-120. There was simply no contract between Han'is and Ferguson other than the
oral contract which the court held was covered by the release.
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Release Precludes Recovery,
The court erred in awarding any costs and attorney fees whatsoever to the Fergusons, given
the plain language of a certain release agreement, offered and admitted as Exhibit 39, without any
objection from the Fergusons' attorney, Tr. 190:22-191 :5. The plain language of this release covers
all claims for costs and fees by any of the Fergusons.
In their response, the Fergusons acknowledge that the release "pertained to damages arising
in any way out of any work perf(xmed by the undersigned (Ferguson) at those certain construction
projects in Rigby, Idaho Ithe Jefferson Project] and Ashton, Idaho [the Fremont Project] in which
the undersigned and the releasees [Harris 1were involved." Ferguson Brief at 31. The Fergusons
then argue that the fraud action Harris asserted against Kym Ferguson had nothing to do with work
the Fergusons performed on the Jetlcrson or Fremont Projects! Ferguson Brief at 31-32.
The court ruled the release did not preclude an attorney fee award against Harris, because the
fees avvarded arose out of Fergusons' work on Foxhollow's subcontract, and not on any of
Fcrgusons' work {ex Harris, Inc. R. 1544. Again, the court acknowledges the attorney fees awarded
did not involve a commercial transaction between Harris and the Fergusons, but rather Foxhollow
and the Fergusons. Given that finding, the Fergusons were not entitled to fees and costs against
Harris. Beco Construction, 145 Idaho at 726,184 P.3d at 851.
Moreover. the plain terms of the release contained no such distinction as employed by the
court and thus the court erred in refusing to apply the clear language of the release by awarding fees
and costs against Harris, contrary to the plain terms of the release.
The Release peliains to "any and air claims, "allY and air rights, "any and air costs, "any
and air expense, and "any and air compensation whatsoever "which [Ferguson] now has or which

may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way grow out of any and all... economic, financiaL.or
other damage, and the consequences thereo/resulting or to result/rom" the Jefferson and Fremont
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Projects. Release (Trial Exhibit 39) at 1 (emphasis added). Moreover. the Release contains this
language: "IUjndersigned has considered not only the ascertained damages and losses, but also the
fact that consequence.';' not now ascertained may result from undersigned's participation in the
af'(xementioned construction projects." Release at I. Clearly, this lawsuit and the litigation and
costs incurred as a result, grew out of, resulted from, and were a consequence of Ferguson's
participation in the Jefferson and Fremont Projects. Therefore. the Release covers Ferguson's claim
for costs and fees.
Moreover. the Release covers all claims for costs and fees by all of the Ferguson defendants.
The Release was signed by Kym Ferguson d/b/a Ferguson Trucking. Release at

It was signed by

Kym Ferguson in this capacity on behalf of his agents as well. Release at 1. "Each partner is an
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business." I.C. § 53-3-301(1). Therefore, in signing
this Release on behalfofFerguson Trucking, Kym Ferguson also bound Michael Ferguson as well.
Indeed. as the Court found, "Defendant D. Kym Ferguson testified that a release he signed with
Harris covered any liabilities Ferguson might assert against Harris with regard to Ferguson's work
on the Fremont Project." Harris Summary Judgment at 2 (emphasis added). Moreover, D. Kym
Ferguson and Michael Ferguson were sued in their capacities as partners in Ferguson Farms d/b/a
Ferguson Trucking. Complaint filed 08117/05 at 2

,,6.

If the court found the release precluded recovery for Ferguson in its counterclaim against
Harris. the court should also have ttlund the release precluded Fergusons' claims against HalTis for
attorney fees and court costs, because they arose from the same set of circumstances that gave rise
to Fergusons' counterclaim against BalTis.

Motion for Fees and Costs Defective.
As noted at pp. 34-35 of Appellant's Brief. Fergusons' motion for costs and fees was
defective as well. First of all, the memorandum of costs and attorney fees contained no discussion
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of an v of the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)
of Harris' claims. R. 131

from a brief assertion that Fergusons prevailed on all

1318. Appellant's Briefat 34. Likewise, Fergusons' briefin support of

their motion t(]r fees contained no reference or discussion of the Rule 54( e)(3) factors. R. 13191321. Appellant's Brief at 34. Finally, the affidavit of the Fcrgusons' attorney failed to discuss all
of the Rule 54(e)(3) Hlctors. Appellant's Briefat 34-35.
Incredibly. Fergusons' response in this regard is that they did not need to address all of the
Rule 54(e)(3) factors! Ferguson Brief at 29. That assertion is directly contrary to Idaho law. The
party seeking an award of tees must give the court sufficient information to enable the court to
consider all of the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), which the court is required to do. Lettunich v.

Lelfunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, III P.3d 110, 120 (2005); Sun Valley Potato Growers. Inc. v. Texas
Refinery Corp.. 139 Idaho 761. 769. 86 P.3d 475, 483 (2004); Hackel!, 109 Idaho at 264, 706 P.2d
at 1372. The affidavit of counsel must address the Rule 54(e)(3) factors. lvfedical Recovery

Serviees, L.L.c. v. Jones. 145 Idaho 106. 110, 175 P.3d 795. 799 (et. App. 2007).
In addition, the Fergusons contend Harris should have raised this issue below. Ferguson
Brief at 30. However. the court's decision as to costs and fees awarded to Ferguson is deemed
included in the notice of appeal. tA.R. 17(e)( I )(C).

Cl Owen v. Boydstun,

102 Idaho 31, 35-36,

624 P.2d 413, 417-18 (1981) (holding that "it is the rule in Idaho that neither an objection to findings
nor a request or motion fiJr findings is a prerequisite to appellate review and such failure to bring the
matter to the attention of the trial court docs not waive the right to bring it up on appeal"). In short,
the Fergusons failed to give the court sutIieient information to allow it to adequately consider all of
the factors of Rule 54(e)(3). Their failure to do so waives their right to attorney fees.

POINT TEN
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING HARRIS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
H-arris' motion for a new trial was based in part on the trial court's refusal to award damages
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on three grounds: (1) that Harris failed to prove damages; (2) that the evidence did not delineate
whether the damages resulted f)'om the Johnson contract, the Foxhollow contract, or both; and (3)
that the payments Harris sent to Johnson were not fiJr Johnson's work on the Fremont Project. The
other grounds for Harris' motion for new trial were discussed in Harris' initial brief. See Appellant's
Brief at 35-37. However. the damages-rclated grounds are the only grounds to which Johnson and
the Fergusons offered any responsive argument. Johnson argues the court was COlTect in denying
a new trial. because Harris testified at length about Harris' internal records but failed to produce
supporting documentation. was not certain as to precise amounts, and gave speculative testimony
with inconclusive and confusing exhibits. Johnson Brief at 25-26. The Fergusons adopt by
reference Johnson's assertions on this issue, and offer no additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 18.
Each of these points have been discussed in great detail in Harris' briefing. See Appellant's
Briefat 9-18 and supra at 3-13 [on failure to prove damages]; Appellant's Briefat 18-20 and supra
at 10-11 [on delineation between Johnson and Foxhollow subcontracts]; and Appellant's Briefat 20,

supra at 12-13 [on payments sent to Johnson].
The Respondents are simply wrong when they assert the court was correct in denying the new
trial on the grounds that Harris did not produce supporting documentation along with Harris business
records. Inspection by the opposing party of the underlying materials is not a prerequisite to a
summary's admission as a business record. Beco Corp. v. Roherts' & S'ons Construction Co .. 114
Idaho 704. 760 P.2d 1120 (1988), overruled on other ground<;, Highland Farms. Inc. v. Johnson, 119
Idaho 72, 803 P.2d 978 (1990). Once the business records were admitted, they became substantive
evidence of damages. This substantive evidence was left unrebutted by the Defendants and should
not have been disregarded by the court. inreDoe, 142 Idaho 594, 598, 130P.3d 1132, 1136(2006);

Wood v. Hoglund 131 Idaho 700, 703. 963 P.2d 383, 386 (1988); Campbell v. Campbell, 120 Idaho
394.399,816 P.2d 350, 355 (et. App.1991); Olsen v. Hawkins, 90 Idaho 28,37,408 P.2d 462,467
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( 1965).
The court's failure to award damages was reversible error, because in so ruling, the court
ignored the unrebutted and credible testimony of Scott Harris as he testified from Harris' business
records. An order denying new trial on damages will be reversed where the plaintiff was a credible
witness, and his unimpeached testimony was not inherently improbable. Dinneen v. Finch. 100
Idaho 620. 626-27, 603 P.2d 575. 581-82 (1979).
As noted, Respondents failed to address any of the other issues cited by Harris concerning
the court's denial of Harris' motion for new trial. Accordingly. Harris stands by the arguments in
its initial brief. See Appellant's Brief at

7.

POINT ELEVEN
THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
Respondents assert they are entitled to attorney fees and court costs on appeal pursuant to
LA.R. 41 and

I.e. § 1

120(3). However. as shown below, neither 10hnson nor the Fergusons are

entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Johnson is not entitled to attorney fees, because lohnson failed
to cite the appropriate statute under which it asserts its claim for attorney fees. Ferguson is not
entitled to attorney fees. because Ferguson cited a commercial transaction statute, I.e. § 12-120(3),
as the basis for its attorney fee claim; however. as discussed above, there was no commercial
transaction between Ferguson and Harris other than the transaction covered by the release (Trial
Exhibit 39). Moreover. neither Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal because neither was
the prevailing paliy in the proceedings below.
tA.R. 41 is a procedural rule and provides no independent basis for attorney fees on appeal.

Parks ide 5,'choofs, Inc. v. Broncho Elite Arts & Athletics, LLe, 145 Idaho 176, 179, 177 P.3d 390,
393 (2008). Therefore, to be awarded attorney fees on appeal, a party must refer to an appropriate
statutory provision that authorizes such an award. Garcia v. Pinkham, 144 Idaho 898, 899, 174 P.3d
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868, 869 (2007). Attorney

will be denied on appeal where the party fails to specify the statute

or contractual provision allowing an award of attorney fees. Parks ide Schools, Inc., 145 Idaho at
179, 177 P.3d at 393.

I.e. § 1

121 is the appropriate statutory authority for attorney fees on appeal where the party

contends the appeal was frivolous. "Attorney

can be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal

under Section 1 121 only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation." Bird v. Bidwell. 147 Idaho 350, 353, 209 P.3d 647, 650 (2009). Attorney fees
can be awarded on appeal under I.e. § 1 121 "only if the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation." Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 779, 186 P.3d 630,635
(2008).
10hnson claims it is entitled to attorney tees on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 41 on the grounds
the appeal was "frivolously brought." 10hnson Briefat 27-28. However, instead of citing I.e. § 12121, the appropriate statute tor frivolous appeals, 10hnson cited

I.e.

§ 12-120(3). This error

precludes 10hnson from an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 10hnson failed to cite the
proper statute for frivolous appeals. Moreover, the court found 10hnson was not "the overall
prevailing party:' that its defense was unsuccessful, and that Johnson did not "predominantly"
prevail. R. 1538. 1540. Johnson has not cross-appealed from this decision, so it remains a nonprevailing party. A non-prevailing party is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Gooding County

v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,205,46 P.3d 18,22 (2002).
Fergusons' request for attorney fees on appeal is flawed as well. Ferguson cites LA.R. 41
and

I.e.

§ 12-120(3) in support.

Ferguson Brief at 32. However, there was no commercial

transaction between Ferguson and Han'is other than the oral agreement which, as the court found,
was covered by the release in Exhibit 39. As discussed supra, the release applies to all expenses,
present and future, that arise in any way out of the circumstances of this case.
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In determining whether to award attorney fees on appeal, the court must consider "the entire
course of the litigation .... ·· Vendelin v. ('ostco

~Wh()lesale

('orp., 140 Idaho 416, 434,95 P.3d 34, 52

(2004). "Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact. attorney fees may not be awarded under
I.C.

~

1 121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous,

unreasonable, or without foundation." Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 434,95 P.3d at

A party is not

entitled to attorney fees on appeal if the appeal "presented a legitimate question for this Court to
address." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City

ol Sun

Valley, 145 Idaho 87. 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780

(2007). "When there are fairly debatable questions attorney fecs are not awardable pursuant to [I.C.

§ I

121]." National Union Fire Insurance

('0.

v. Dixon, ] 41 Idaho 537. 542, 112 P.3d 825. 830

(2005). "Ordinarily. attorncy fees will not be awarded [under I.e. § 1 121] where the losing party
brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented." Chi...·holm v. Twin
Fa/l..." County. 139 Idaho 131. 136, 75 P.3d 185. 190 (2003).
In this case. the issues presented on appeal were genuine issues of law, fairly debatable, and
presented legitimate questions for this cOllli to consider. Those issues include, inter alia, the
following:
1.

The trial court's refusal to award damages in spite of substantive. competent evidence

that went unrebutted:
2.

.rhe co urt' s refusal to award damages in sp ite 0 f su bstanti ve, com petent evi dence that

gave precise amounts of damages claimed;
3.

The COlirt' s refusal to award damages in spite of the uncontradicted testimony of Scott

Harris based on personal knowledge and experience in the industry;
4.

The court's refusal to award damages on the grounds that the court could not

distinguish between damages attributable to the principal (Johnson) and the principal's agent (Egan!
Foxhollow);
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5.

l'he court's refusal to consider the General Conditions (Exhibit 50) due to concerns

with authenticity when stIch objections were waived:
6.

The courf s awarding costs and

to Johnson after it found Johnson was not the

overall prevailing party:
7.

The court's awarding costs and fCes to Ferguson under I.C. § 1 120 when it found

no contract or commercial relationship between Ferguson and Harris which was not covered by the
release (Exhibit 39): and
8.

The court's failing to find Foxhollow was also an agent of Johnson after finding Egan

functioned as an agent of Johnson and an employee of Foxhollow.
Accordingly. for the reasons stated. neither Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLlJSION

Numerous errors on the pmi of the trial court require a reversal of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law. and vacating the judgments entered. First. the trial court erred in refusing to
award damages to Harris, in spite of Scott Harris' testimony concerning damages and the
documentary evidence admitted as I-farris business records which remained unimpeached. The
documentary evidence gave precise figures as to the damages incurred by Harris. Harris also gave
competent testimony based on his experience as to other items of damages claimed. Second, the trial
court erred in refusing to consider the General Conditions to Contract, Trial Exhibit 50, after any
objections to authenticity were waived, especially after finding duties and responsibilities that could
stem only from Exhibit 50. Third, the trial court erred in not awarding damages against the
Fergusons in spite of the documentary evidence of such damages that was also admitted without
objection.

Fourth. the court erred in refusing to admit Plaintiffs Exhibit 55i55-A, because

supporting invoices had indeed been submitted to Respondents' counsel even before formal
discovery. and were also made available at Scott Harris' deposition duces tecum. Fifth, the court
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erred in refusing to amend
after findi

findings and conclusions to lind Foxhollow was an agent of Johnson,

Egan was an agent of Johnson and an employee of Foxhollow. Sixth, the court erred

in awarding attorney

and court costs to Johnson after finding Johnson was not the overall

prevailing party. Seventh, the court erred in awarding attorney lees and court costs to Ferguson
against I farris when the only commercial transaction between Ferguson and Harris was, as the eourt
found, covered by the release (Trial Exhibi(19). Finally, given these errors. the court further erred

in denying Harris' motion II)!' new trial.

RESPECTFUU S SUBMITTED this 17th day of November, 2010.
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94) .

f

burden has been
of the

i

's
rty'

0

non

0

issue for t

al

Di

Sf

Inc.,

(Ct.

.1993)

ils to

admissibl
elements of

1 3 Idaho 937,

facts

See

stence of an

Idaho

941-42, 854 P.2d 280,
On the

hand, where

of action,

Rule 56(e)

r

ed.

must be

summary j

90

100 Idaho at 69, 593 P.2d at 404;

Idaho at 326-27,

411 P.2d at 771-72.
I.R.C.P., regJires that both supporting and

affidavits be made on personal knowledge, set forth

facts that would be

ssible in evidence, and show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testi
matters stated therein.

[vloreo ver,

conclusions do not satisfy
facts.

284-85

issues on all of the

e

caus

when the

tablish the
V.

omitted).

(c1 tat

a

urnmary j

will not

of his case.

Ser

the

Id.

the motion

e senti. 1

vidence,

t

exis

fact

pa

oppos

6 Idaho 308,

Hecla M_ini

. v

th~

to the

5sible opinions or

requirements for proof of material

S! ar-Mo

Co., 122 Idaho 778,

783-

--------~~~~~~--~-~ ----------~~---
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78

8

f

97 1 00

d 11

10,
10

(

99 )

, 11 0,

( 1 86) ,

479 U.S. 1007 (1986) .

urmna.ry j

ct

, the Court
in sworn aff

admi

~~TERIAL

FACTS

and

u
rna

s~ated

498 U.S.

r

10 Idaho 925, 9 0, 7 9 P.2d

III. STATEMENT OF
t

Evan

796 P. d 87, 90 ( 1 90) , cert. den

f

1) ;

11

;

most p

in favor of the
nds the

11

e

oppos
material facts to

ts, and exhibits which would be

under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
This

lic work contracts. On June 13,

involves two

2002,

was awarded a construction contract by the Fremont

County Joint School District
chao

in Ashton,

or the construction of a new high

(hereafter

I

~Ashton

Project"). On October

18, 2001, Harris was awarded a construction contract by the
T~

uc

fcrson

SchooJ

Distr ct No. 251 for a Water Boost

Station, Sewer Lift Station, and Water and Sewer Line
Extension at the Rigby Hi
As is

red by

Ie

School

(hereafter "Rigby Project")

§54-1926, Harris obtained Payment Bond No.

54-116191 from United for the Rigby project, and Payment Bond No.
54-127467 from United for the Ashton project.
In June,
work on both

2002, Harris contracted with Fox Hollow to perform
ects.

ces of equ
i'1EtJ10Rp.NDUl'1 DECISION

Thereafter Fox Hollow rented various

from Pro Rentals for use in performing the
p~ND

ORDE1.

6

ub

on

Accord

o

wa

1

invoice

60"

25029

84"

27082

6"

Jones,

Pro
on

follows:

Equipment

4 9

equ

to Fox Hollow but not

were
are

on

Invoice #

it
and

o

Renta s
the

he two proj ct sites.

work

or

Date Returned

Amt. Billed

6/18/0

$3,245.00

18/02

$255.00

8/1 /0

$411. 00

27379

Skid Steer

9/3/02

$1,155.00

27520

Skid Steer

9/3/02

$217.50

Acco

to the invoice

attached to the affidavits, the

last of any Pro Rentals equipment that had been rented to Fox
Hollow was used at the Ashton project was a Case 1838 Skid Steer.
(See invoice 27520)
Acco

to the affidavits of

sand

Jones, Pro

Rentals invoices that were sent to Fox Hollow but not paid on the
Project are as follows:
Invoice #

Equipment

Date Returned

23497

Compactor

5/4/02

$48.70

23832

Mini Excavator

5/9/02

$1,055.00

23681

Compressor/Breaker
& Hose

5/10/02

$99.20

23759

Tractor w/loader

5/12/02

$252.00

23873

Tractor Rental

(no date given)

$4.18
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Amt. Billed

7

40 0

4"

437

rr

1

(no

5

4 "
4" Saw

4

invoi

~

L

a s equ

0

Hollow wa
0

the
18, 200

on

On S

at

1/02

8.25
$1,005.00

5/27/02

$22.00

5/29/02

$246.65

ched to the affidavits,

the

nt that had been rented to Fox
project
(See

WdS

a Double Drum 0024

nvoice 15028)

ember 13, 2002, Pro Rentals'

letters to Harris

$187.95

/ 0/0

\,f

6"

44

e given)

attorney mailed two

certified mail notifying Harris that Fox

ow had not paid Pro Rentals $8.057.90 for equipment used at
the Ashton project and $3,166.11 for equipment used at the Rigby
ect. On

same date Pro Rentals' attorney sent by regular

mail copies of these two letters to Harris, United, Fox Hollow
and each school district project owner. Although the envelopes
attached to the Jones affidavit indicate the U. S. Postal Service
gave a first notice to Harris on September 16 th and second notice
on

ember 26 th ,

the return receipt showing the actual delivery

date is not in this record. The affidavit of Scott Harris states
he received the letters in "mid-September, 2002." See Harris Aff.
at
Thereafter Harris paid some of the invoices, but Harris
re

ed to pay for equipment that was last used on either project

more than 90 days from when Harris received notice. See Harris
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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from

on

err

ter da

1

schedul

"

00

t

hi

1,

proj

00

equ

Pro Rentals is

HollOVJ

0

8

fo

fo

hton

the

s

"

ect.

t.

t

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Pro Rentals' Motion to Strike Harris Affidavit.

Pro Rentals seeks to strike the Harris
affi

in

sition to a motion for summary judgment must be

filed at least 14 days before
I.R.C.P.,

ffidavit because

he

under Rule 56(c),

and leave of court was not reques ed

requested time to file an oppo ition memorandum.

ffidavit.

Tucke

Aff.

at
F'ox Hollow

that Harris
money to be used to pay third
there

Fox Hollow

~was

Pro Rentals also
of an

argues that it did not consent to the late fil
it

United when it

ies such a

olerpaid."

Pro Rentals,

Also Harris'

and

affidavit

states that he received the September 13 th letters in "midSeptember, 2002." These fac ts are not material to a decision on
pending motion for sUffi'nary judgment. Lastly the Harris
affidavit attaches a copy of a back page from a Pro Rentals
equipment lease. However,

there is no foundation for Harris who

is not an employee of eilher Pro Rentals
MEJvIORANDUi'-'l DECISION l\ND OF DER

(the lessor)

nor Fox
9

(t

110'"

ar,y foundat on

) r

how

about the
ibl

to

tached document,

Further the

i

in

no

any of the actual
Ho

Oltl

ummer of 199
from

1

on

1 t

st

must

r any of the
Since no

id
udice to

filing of the Harris
denied.

B. Pro Rentals' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The
subcont

1

ller Act

ier to prosecute a claim for

or materials

unpaid wo k or mat
bond supplied

des for a federal works project

s used in a federal project against a
the contractor. In 1965 Idaho enacted

the Public Contracts Bond Act, codified at I. C. §54 1925 et.
referred to as a

• r

neled jn 1980 to
state

lic vwrks p

rentals under the

~mini

that s

Miller Act."

This Act was

iers of equipment used on

ecls could also recover unpaid equipment
bond posted by the general contractor.

I. C. §54-1927 requires subcontractors and materials
suppliers, as a condition precedent to filing suit against the
bond surety, to give 90 days notice to the contractor. It
states:
"Every claimant who has furnished labor or material or
rented, leased, or otherwise supplied equipment in the
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in
respect of which a payment bond is furnished tinder this
act, and who has not been paid in full therefor before
MEJvlORANDUM DECISION AND OEDER

10

performed

material or equipment was furnished
for
whom the labor was done or
be served
mailing the same
or certified
mail, postage prepaid, in an
addressed to the
contractor at any
ace he maint
an office or
conducts his business or at his re idence.
(emphasis
added) .
If

"equipment" is rnent

Al

e

on in the statute

and at the conclusion, it is not expressly mentioned
inning of the 90
statut

f

his Court concludes tnat

Legislature omitted "e
the

sian.

not

Constru

the
the entire

oversight, the

" from the second to last line of

ion of the statute undi;rlined above for

sis. In

other words the Legislature mednt that clause to re
however, that any such cLlimant having a direct cant
relationship with a subcontract or of the contractor furnishing
such payment bond but no contr2ctual relationship expressed or
ied with such contractoI shall not have a
of action
upon such payment bond unless [\ e has
ven written notice to such
contractor within ninety (90) c:ays from the date on which such
claimant performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied
the last of the material or eqLipment for which such claim is
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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)

1

.
ng I. C.

1

o

4

o

must be

i r within 90

s

1

j

the

ived

ect. Second,
daho
whe1:

r

1

must

rty

o

p

n s

ch
the la

t po

of unpaid
used

ce of

noted above. As to

rgues that only one notice within

90

od runs

ce fo

fi

a

the s cond po

ect is

ing the statute as to

ice aft

j

it

int

rental equipment was used on the

sary. In opposition Harris argues that the 90 day
the t

each piece of rental equipment is used.

rt of their respective

s the parties cite
the Miller Act, and a few

several federal decisions

state cases from other jurisdictions. This Court has considered
the ca es cit

Unless

scussed below, this Court has

determined that the facts

the cases are too different to be of

any persuasive value in deciding this motion.
Ashton Project

Based on the Court's own research it appears that the
similar federal Miller Act

s teen interpreted by a few federal

courts as requiring a materials supplier, and by analogy an
equipment supplier, to just mai.1 the notice to the contractor
tvlElvJORANDut1 DECISION AND ORDER
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1

90

27

al. Uni ed

(E.D.N.Y. 1966),

ff'd 37

F.2d 207

~U~.~~_~~_~______
v_._C~o_n~t_i_r:_Ie_-_n_t__l_____-"'--_C-'---o_.,

19 7);
E'

mat

Prod. Co. v. Greene Elec. Serv.,

I. Lincoln
4,

tot

upp. 87

19

(E. D.

). One federal court has he
red within 90

the contractor is
formed.

Insulation

70 F.

1 40

(4 ttl Ci

rul

that
of

. 1 92)
of the notice

of

worrying about unpaid

whose notice was never received,

the

owner and

contractor in being able to close out final
ects vIi

last

Inc. v. Artco

contractor furthers the interest of the sure

construction

245

rd

ies

such rule encourages contractors

ance of certified or registered mail for several

to refu e
or entire

to escape

ing notice of unpaid claims under

the Miller Act. In this case, it appears that Harris did not pick
up

certi

ed letters from the Pocatello post

notices from the post

0

ce after

ce on September 16 th and September 26 th •

ly, the post office then returned the certified letters
to Pro Rentals' attorney on October 4, 2002 as being undelivered.
For this reason, this Court questions the wisdom of the 4~
Circuit Court of Appeals.
On the

rule ,:equiring only mailing by t

claimant is subject to abuse if the claimant back dates his
notice,

or simply claims that hel.imely mailed the notice, when
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res

di

t

tu

qui

imant:

the

the mail

po t

he

noti

ffi

with the

the cont

intended th t the cont

S

th

ember 1

slature intended that

job site, it must have
for receiving mail, i.e.,

o

. In this case it was at

s September 16, 2002,

Pro Renta

Sf

to pick up

nit.

Idaho

be the date of

0

least as early
to

ract

i

being supp1 ed on

its post

mailed and

claimant's notice within 90 days of

i

the equ

was actual

record of the

I imant's noti
tha

either

post office has an

I

d noti

i

the

practi

i

o
t

mail. This

gi

fi

t

he mail

the date it attempted

letters to Harris. Counting back 90 days from

s June 18 th .

On the Ashton project alJ of the rented

used and

for which paid is currently

was last used between June 18,

2002 and September 3, 2002.

Since all are within the 90 notice

period,

Pro Rentals has complied with the notice condition in I.

c. §54 1927.

The uncont

cted facts establish the reasonable

amount owed to Pro RentaJ for

used at the Ashton

project is $5,283.50. However, the complaint in the Fremont
County case only alleges $4,757.90 as unpaid principal before
adding tnLerest. Therefore partial summary judgment should be
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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1

Court IV against United for

with i

onabl

t becomes ne

c.

fees.

att

sary to consider whe

e 90 day notice for each

renta

not

th

,

§

4 1

ece of

aJ equ

upreme Court has ruled that the

c.

1.

or only one notice within 90 days

d

o

r

sions of I.

7 follow those of the federal Miller Act. Les Schwab
~nc.,

Tire Centers of

v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319,

528 P.2d 201

(1974) .

st, in enacting the
the word \\

to I. C. §54-2719,

" to the statute, the I

which added

slature stated the

was made to provide suppliers of equipment with the same
claim ri
argues,
then,

as s
he

iers of labor and materials.

slature deliberat

unlike suppliers of

materi~l

If,

as Harris

excluded the "equipment."
and labor, providers of

would not be required to give ninety days notice at
all.

However,

in light of the stated purpose for adding

"equipment" to the statute, as stated by this Court above, it is
unlikely that the I

slature intended this result.

An inspection of comparable statutes in other states reveals
t

t

some states include the word equipment in the ninety day

notice requirement.

For example, the Rhode Island §37-12-2

statute reads:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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sha 1

the
the
or her;
rect
but no
the

mater I or
ied. The notice shall be
certified mail, postage
addressed to the cant ['act
maintains an office, conducts
or her residence." (
sis

amount claimed and
labor was
shed or
wa furnished or
served
mailing the same
in an envelope
prepa
ace he or she
at any
his or her business, or his
added. )

~hose

the word "equipment," also

include s

statutes whi
iers of

in the

t

notice

and state that the notice runs from the
equipment was supplied to the subcontractor.
not anticipate a notice
ece of equipment was s

sent out

od,

when the last of the
s language does
days after each

'd, but rather after the last was

supplied.
It is also helpful to consider cases that have addressed the
issue under the Miller Act.
MEMORANDU£Vl DECISION AND ORDEr<

All

the language of the Miller
16

on

I

t

e

been
I a

unci

t.

h

v.

Inc.

son

in u.s.

Co

ui

19 1)

equ

293 F.2d 816
ad run

ld that the no

f

t

iva

.

(
\

Ca

er-

Cir.

from the time the

for u e on the project.

abi

i

ex. reI.

See also

u.
7 F. d
~

the

no mention of

time

Santa

\;/i thin

if

delivery.

Inc.,

822 F.2d 547

_W_a_t_e_r_,l_!V_O_____.......2,~~
(1 st Cir.

1997).

__

Cir.

(

See also U.S.

cases from other circuits).
1969),

days from the date of

U.S. for
A&M Petroleum Inc. v.
------------------------------------------------

------,~----~~.---~------

r.

in the Miller Act,

held that notice as to all materials

shave uni
or 1

(9 th C i r. 1 9 6 4) .

90

and U.S.

1987)

(collecting

v. Andrews,

406 F.2d

for the use and benefit of

_k.._._v_·_._G_e_o_'r..-"'-_~'_____C_:o_n_s_'_t_.~C.-·o."J 131 F. 3d 28

The language of the case::; that deal with

is the same as the language of those cases that deal
with the s
t

Y of 1

or

mat'~rial;

the notice runs from the

the equipment was last use(! on the

of the last delivery or supply.

ect,

or from the time

Thus, the analysis of a claim

for labor or material vdll be th,) same as

i~hat

for

supply of

equ
In addition,

a notice period that runE
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t wa
a

1

on

u

th

i.

i

Ii

t

th
fil

t

The Nelti

the

Act in the can

11

that th

e

noU

h.el

1

ad wa

wh

for

made.

v. St. Pau]

Fi

court

that thi

on Co
N.Y.

ho

1

slative intent of removing unne

1

ing
1 Ii

a

1

4

( 00 ).

the

ary

cles and

to laborers and material s

iers;

date for general contractors

s

secondary under the Miller Act to

ecting laborers and

mate

to

s

iers, a

s

The

t

stated

amendment of IC §54-2719.
I

President of Fox Hollow, and

employee of Fox Hollar,}, a:'i
Pro Rentals,

11 as

state in the

Egan,

Jones, President of

ts that the rent

of

ipment for the Ashton Pro-i ect was considered one contract, and
the rental of equipment for the

gby

ect another, even

though the invoices were generated
Egan,

~

5; Aff. of David Egan,

Jones states that
tho
period.

invoie~s

~

See Aff. of Demian

5; Aff.

Jones,

were generat

the equipment may be u :i.lized on the
Aff. of Doug Jones,
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Thus,
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11.

rnonthly, even
eet for a longer

the contract between
18

t

runn

f

ccount, rathe

t

Under

a

re a

a

t

ni
t

than

occurred,

cl

ty

, regardless of

nd bombard

ractor

and benefit of Robe
row Canst. Co.

v. tAJill
1,1

(f] .

~~

u

.

a1

on which the supplier

\\

ier must

st of the

ied the last of the

contract) .

between the parties had not been an

the

open contract, cou

s

the

c

contract and
Contract
Noland,

and the s

that contract; where claims are based

al for
Even i

655

contracts, a claim must be made within 90 days

from the dat
mat

647 ,

1 er Act must be

aft r the

ied unde

7f

ies

a

nin

8 6 F.Supp.

unde

cant

t
1m

mat

cIa

9

s

havE'

in the .,1Otice requirements between an open

s of

se

red the issue, hold that

contr~cts.

273 F. 2 d 917,

920

Noland Co. v. Allied
(4 th.

Ci r. 1959).

In

the court held that the "90 day period is not stated to

be measured from the

te of U:e last delivery of the materials

under an entire contract or on a running account or under each
s

rate order.

within 90

Miller Act

contemplates one such notice

from the furni~hing of the last materials

furnished in the prosecutioll of the prime contract from which
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40

1

F . d 7 90

(4 th C i r .

).

purpo

Hill
nd hi

t

9

t.ha t

t. J n

h

a

t"vo
and

he l,vJ 1

o

those furni

7

the not
the

and

holdi

4) .

period

wa

d:

is

that

the date the last of

furnished to Fox Hollow,

s

does not

the purpose of either Ie §54 2719 or the Miller Act.
In thi
is ine

ca e Harris also argues

able.

ected
Electr

a~\

74

(1~8J).

number of
materi

was

Co.

See e . . Coast
.3d 879,

144 Cal.

193

Courts hold that general contractors have a

In this case, the e

f

paying
,

cks issued jointly with mat

performance bonds from subcontractors.

of

cl

, such as withholding payment for ninety

Ri

them

Pro Rentals. This

es available to protect them from

subcontractors with

at t

again t

Fox Hollmv the

at least one other state court.

Co. v. Industrial Indemnit
r.

the cIa

Harris argues that it has
rd parties such

money

t

and

Id.

pment was rented by Fox Hollow for use

project from

tL

June 18, 2002. Since Ha

received notice on September 16 th from the Pocatello post office
that Pro Rentals'

certified letters were there to be picked up,
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s

1

vJi

Pro Rent
amount of

in

p

int

and reasonabl
IV.

s

on

fo

,018.93,

s and

inst
with

0

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

ng,

HEREBY OEDEPE
i

noti

should be entered on Count

County

Un

J

utory 90

t

1 summary j

nt.

IV

[]

t.he Court

tal

I

eludes, and IT IS

motion for

ial summary

GRANTED.

DATED this 16th

October, 2003.

,~

/tl::R-~X/-W~
i eha rd T. -~S-t-.-C-:-1-::--a-:-i-r--------DISTRICT JUDGE
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003 f

I

document upon
correct
tage
in the re
to
hand-del

8340

6 0

(COURTHOUSE BOX)

(rV1AIL)

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville CountYr Idaho

BY~

Deputy Clerk
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